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Abstract
Authenticated safety beacons in Vehicular Communication (VC) systems ensure awareness among neighboring vehicles.
However, the verification of beacon signatures introduces significant processing overhead for resource-constrained vehic-
ular On-Board Units (OBUs). Even worse in dense neighborhood or when a clogging Denial of Service (DoS) attack
is mounted. The OBU would fail to verify for all received (authentic or fictitious) beacons. This could significantly
delay the verifications of authentic beacons or even affect the awareness of neighboring vehicle status. In this paper,
we propose an efficient cooperative beacon verification scheme leveraging efficient symmetric key based authentication
on top of pseudonymous authentication (based on traditional public key cryptography), providing efficient discovery of
authentic beacons among a pool of received authentic and fictitious beacons, and can significantly decrease waiting times
of beacons in queue before their validations. We show with simulation results that our scheme can guarantee low waiting
times for received beacons even in high neighbor density situations and under DoS attacks, under which a traditional
scheme would not be workable.
Keywords: Security, Privacy, Pseudonymous authentication, Efficiency
1. Introduction
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure
(V2I) communication in Vehicular Communication (VC)
systems entail high-rate transmissions: typically, for safety
beacons, vehicles/On-Board Units (OBUs) transmit at a
rate of 10 Hz, i.e., 10 beacons per second. In spite of ap-
proaches that adapt the beacon rate, the challenge is clear:
as VC systems get progressively widely deployed, each ve-
hicle will have to process safety beacons (along with other
traffic) from several tens of vehicles within its OBU range,
e.g., 300 messages per second for 30 neighboring vehicles.
The provision of security and privacy protection aggra-
vates the situation, adding communication overhead (dig-
ital signatures and short-term certificates attached, thus
longer messages), as well as computation overhead (signa-
ture verifications mostly, and signature calculations).
A number of improvements (e.g., [1, 2, 3]) are compat-
ible with the standardized pseudonymous authentication
approach. For example, the Pseudonymous Certificates
(PCs), termed pseudonyms, can be attached to beacons
periodically or based on the sender’s context [3], instead of
attaching on each and every beacon. At the receiver side,
a PC needs to be validated only once and cached [2]. For
newly received beacons attached with cached PCs, only
the signatures on beacons need to be verified. These ap-
proaches provide significant improvements and show how
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one can dimension processing power [1, 2], but they are
conservative: they assume each node verifies signatures on
all received beacons. Indeed, this is the straightforward
approach. An alternative, adaptive, reactive approach has
been considered in [4], but only for multi-hop messages.
In [5], vehicles share beacon verification results, so that
the vehicles can benefit from verification efforts of neigh-
boring vehicles. However, the work only considered an en-
vironment in which only benign vehicles broadcast authen-
tic beacons. In fact, dynamic vehicular mobility and thus
topology (connectivity and physical neighborhood) creates
a simple yet very effective attack vector, a clogging DoS at-
tack: an attacker, even external, could generate large vol-
umes of fictitious beacons, purportedly from not previously
encountered vehicles/OBUs. This would essentially pre-
vent timely reception and validation of legitimate beacons.
Even more so if there are multiple such offending adversar-
ial transmitters across an area of the VC system - in which
case, one could even classify this as a distributed attack, a
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. Discovering
valid pseudonyms is challenging, because each node re-
ceives a pool of valid and non-valid pseudonyms, while the
non-valid pseudonyms could be the majority. This attack
is cheap, because the attacker only needs to generate ran-
dom bytes as signatures and attaches them to the broad-
casted masqueraded beacons, while all its neighbors would
be affected. Although the shared verification results can
expedite the validation process [5], the beacon queue can
be saturated by an extremely high fictitious beacon rate,
inevitably resulting in significantly high waiting time for
authentic beacons (the majority of computation resources
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has to be used to verify fictitious signatures). Moreover,
a successful PC verification does not guarantee the timely
verifications of following beacons from the same sender,
because adversaries can simply attach valid PCs to the
fictitious beacons.
This is exactly the problem we address in this paper.
We extend the design of cooperative beacon verification
scheme proposed in [5] by taking into consideration the
defense against DoS attacks and leveraging efficient sym-
metric key based authentication. Here, we use Timed Ef-
ficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication (TESLA) [6]
on top of (a traditional public key cryptography based)
pseudonymous authentication. Vehicles cooperatively dis-
cover beacons signed under new authentic PCs and cache
the PCs. The beacons attached with cached PCs can be
validated based on (1) signature verifications, (2) shared
verification results, or (3) TESLA Message Authentication
Codes (MACs). Our simulation results show our scheme
can significantly decrease waiting time for authentic bea-
cons in high neighbor density situations and under DDoS
attacks, where a traditional scheme would not be workable.
In the rest of the paper, we provide background in-
formation on VC security and privacy and related works
(Sec. 2), we then explain the system and adversary mod-
els, and security requirements (Sec. 3). We present in de-
tail our scheme (Sec. 4), and provide a security analysis
(Sec. 5), followed by evaluation based on simulation re-
sults (Sec. 6), before concluding remarks (Sec. 7).
2. Background and related works
A basic functionality for VC systems is safety beacons,
used to inform vehicle status to surrounding/neighboring
vehicles. This can in turn improve traffic efficiency and
safety by virtue of the awareness of the transportation en-
vironment. Authentication and integrity of safety beacons
are strictly required. Traditional public key cryptography
could provide those, yet the use of a long-term key pair and
certificate would undermine user privacy: safety beacons
could be trivially used to continuously track the sender
vehicles. Pseudonymous authentication [2, 7, 8, 9] pro-
vides both security and privacy for safety beacons. A PC
is a short-term certificate issued by the Vehicular Public-
Key Infrastructure (VPKI) without any information on
the long-term identity of the vehicle, thus making mes-
sages signed under different PCs unlinkable. However,
this anonymity/pseudonymity is conditional: when mis-
behavior is detected, the relevant PCs (corresponding to
the misbehaving OBU/vehicle) can be revealed through a
resolution protocol and then revoked [2, 7, 8, 9].
Signature verifications remain expensive for resource-
constrained OBUs. Thus, optimizations for decreasing
communication and computation overhead [1, 2] have been
proposed, but they do not change the fact that the signa-
tures on each and every received beacons should be veri-
fied. Cooperative beacon verification [5, 10] can help val-
idating beacons based on shared verification results, but
it is not resilient to DoS attacks, because a large portion
of computation resources would still be used to verify fic-
titious beacons. PCs can be validated based on a pre-
downloaded bloom filter [11], but PCs for newly joining
vehicles (commonly so in VC systems) after the genera-
tion (and downloading) of the bloom filter would not be
included, thus signatures on those PCs need to be verified.
This could still leave a gap for adversarial nodes to inject
fictitious PCs to the network.
TESLA-based authentication for VC systems [12, 13]
provides a cheaper way for validating successive beacons
by a given sender, after a successful signature verifica-
tion. However, it is still critical to validate new PCs and
the corresponding beacons in high node density environ-
ment or under DoS attacks in a timely manner. Predic-
tion of the next beacon content (e.g., vehicle location) can
help validating beacons based on the prediction result in-
cluded in a previous beacon [14, 15]. However, such an
approach cannot tolerate packet losses: once a beacon is
lost, the following beacon can only be verified based on
its signature. Integrating with TESLA-based authentica-
tion can address packet losses in the prediction-based ap-
proaches [15]. However, in a network with high packet loss
ratio (in dense neighborhood or under DoS attacks), the
majority of beacons need to be validated based on TESLA
MACs, while the prediction based authentication would be
barely used.
Recall that vehicles need to change their PCs periodi-
cally and frequently. An adversary can target this feature
and flood with fictitious beacons, which can significantly
delay verifications (and affect the caching) of new PCs.
This problem is not addressed by any of the works dis-
cussed above. Our scheme addresses this problem by pro-
viding a cooperative approach for efficiently discovering
authentic PCs when a large amount of new (authentic and
fictitious) PCs are received, and can provide timely beacon
validation with shared verification results and TESLA.
Puzzle-based approaches [16, 17] have been proposed
to defend against DoS attacks for mutual authentication
in V2I and V2V communication, but they are not suitable
for authenticating frequent connectionless safety beacons.
Efficient pseudonym validation schemes based on alterna-
tive non-classical cryptographic primitives (e.g., ID-based
cryptography) [18, 19, 20] rely on connection to Road-
side Unit (RSU) and need to communicate with RSUs for
updating pseudonyms of newly joined or revoked nodes,
and could fail to validate pseudonyms when connection
to RSUs is lost. An efficient Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) release approach [21] is proposed to defend against
DoS attacks on CRL checking, however, this is orthogonal
to our scheme and the two can co-exist.
3. System model and security requirements
3.1. System and adversary model
In our system, each vehicle is equipped with a set of
PCs obtained from a VPKI [9]. We assume a Sybil-resilient
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Figure 1: Adversaries launching DDoS attacks.
pseudonym lifetime policy as the one proposed in [9]: PCs
have non-overlapping lifetimes and all pseudonym lifetimes
are aligned. We mandate each and every beacon of a vehi-
cle is properly signed with the private key corresponding
to the currently valid PC.
We consider an overall landscape of adversarial mod-
els, and security and privacy requirements [22] for our
scheme design, while, in this paper, we are primarily con-
cerned with adversaries that seek to exhaust computation
resources of OBUs. As shown in Fig. 1, adversaries can
flood the VC systems with fake beacons at high rate (e.g.,
on the road side with powerful devices) to prevent vehicles
from validating other vehicles’ beacons in a timely manner.
Due to the broadcast nature of V2V communication, even
a single adversary could create devastating effect as ficti-
tious beacons would affect all vehicles within communica-
tion range. Even more so, an adversary could mount DoS
attacks at multiple points with several devices, resulting
in a DDoS attack. This can affect the awareness of neigh-
boring vehicles and a number of VC applications. The
fictitious beacons will be proven invalid when the signa-
tures are verified. However, in a traditional scheme (in the
absence of DoS-resilient and efficient verification mecha-
nism), this could significantly delay verifications of authen-
tic beacons, because long waiting times are needed when
the queues are saturated with fictitious beacons. More
specifically, vehicles cannot distinguish authentic beacons
among the received (authentic and fictitious) beacons and
verify them first in order to gain awareness of surrounding
vehicles.
3.2. Security and privacy requirements
Our scheme is designed to address the above mentioned
adversary model taking into consideration the following
security and privacy requirements:
Authentication and integrity - Node messages should
allow their receivers to corroborate the legitimacy of their
senders and verify they were not modified or replayed. We
do not require strict identification of the sender, but re-
quire the validation that the sender is a legitimate partic-
ipant of the VC systems.
Non-repudiation and accountability - Any node can be
tied to its actions, and, if need arises, be held accountable
and possibly have its long-term identity revealed and have
itself evicted from the system.
Anonymity/Pseudonymity and unlinkability - A vehi-
cle’s beacons should be only linkable over a protocol se-
lectable period, τ . Anonymity/Pseudonymity should be
conditional, allowing the system to identify a misbehaving
node and evict it.
DoS-resilience - Nodes should be resilient to adversar-
ial nodes and their flooded fictitious beacons. Even under
DoS attacks, increase in beacon validation delays should
be moderate and nodes should be able to gain awareness
of neighboring vehicles in a timely manner.
Table 1: Notation
N Neighbor size
PC Pseudonymous certificate
{msg}σ
PC
Signed message with PC attached
α No. of verification results in a beacon
γ Beacon frequency
τ PC lifetime
H()/H Hash function/Hash value
MACK(msg) H(K||msg)
LH Hash/MAC size
LTESLA Length of TESLA key chain
tnow Fresh timestamp (current time)
tnext Next own beacon point after tnow
Prloss Probability of packet loss
4. Our scheme
4.1. Overview
Our scheme extends the traditional V2V message veri-
fication, leveraging cooperating vehicles (referred as nodes
in the rest of the paper) to defend against DoS attacks
and reduce validation delays. The basic idea is to aug-
ment each (safety) beacon with brief identifiers of previ-
ously validated beacons, and attach with TESLA key and
MAC. The identifiers indicate the corresponding beacons
have been verified by the sender. This is exactly where
nodes can benefit from each other: accepting a beacon
can help verifying the (received and queued) beacons the
identifiers in this beacon point to. The TESLA keys and
MACs can expedite message validation, thus remaining re-
silient to extreme network situations that vehicles receive
more beacons than they could handle/verify. Moreover,
under a DoS attack, these identifiers point nodes to the
potentially valid beacons attached with non-cached PCs.
These beacons are assigned higher priority in the queue
so that nodes can obtain faster the sought awareness of
surrounding benign nodes. Table 1 summarizes notation
used in this paper.
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Figure 2: TESLA key chain generation and usage.
4.2. TESLA key chain generation
Each node broadcasts safety beacons at a rate γ. In
this paper, we assume γ = 10 Hz, a typical value in
the literature [23, 15, 14]. Thus, a PC can be used for
authenticating at most LTESLA = τ · γ beacons. For
each pseudonym, a node generates a TESLA key chain [6]
with a length of LTESLA, as shown in Fig. 2. H() and
H ′() are two different hash functions. Ki is the key that
will be disclosed with the beacon broadcasted during time
slot, Ti+1, and K
′
i = H
′(Ki) is the key used to calculate
TESLA MAC for the beacon during Ti. An independent
TESLA key chain is generated for each PC, in order to
ensure unlinkability among the beacons broadcasted (and
authenticated) under different PCs. For example, consider
τ = 5 min, then a node generates a hash chain for each
pseudonym, with LTESLA = 3, 000. In our scheme, each
beacon is signed by the sender with the private key cor-
responding to the currently valid PC and also attached
with a TESLA MAC calculated based on the correspond-
ing TESLA key. Each TESLA key is used to authenticate
a beacon broadcasted during its corresponding time slot.
We assume clocks of nodes are loosely synchronized and
system time is split in a same manner for each node. Each
time slot (Ti) is 0.1 sec and we mandate each node should
broadcast only one beacon within a time slot. The exact
time points each node broadcasts beacon in a time slot
could vary, but we assume beacons from a single node is
periodical (i.e., broadcasted every 0.1 sec). The corre-
sponding TESLA key, Ki (and K
′
i), should be only used
to authenticate a beacon broadcasted within the corre-
sponding time slot Ti. For example, K
′
i should be used
to generate MAC for Beaconi and K
′
i+2 should be used
to generate MAC for Beaconi+2. In case a beacon was
skipped or not successfully broadcasted during, e.g., Ti+1,
then Ki+1 (and K
′
i+1) should be skipped. This helps re-
ceivers to authenticate TESLA MACs with correct TESLA
keys based on the beacon reception times.
A node needs at most 864, 000 TESLA keys per day
(i.e., 24 h) with γ = 10 Hz. Thus, the maximum storage
needed is 864, 000 ∗ LH . For example, with LH = 80 bit
(such a hash size is sufficient for safety beacons, due to
their ephemeral nature), the storage size is 8.64 MB. A
node could store a TESLA key every, e.g., 10 slots and cal-
culate the TESLA keys in between on-the-fly when they
are needed. For example, Ki and Ki+10 can be stored, and
Ki+1 ... Ki+9 can be easily calculated based on Ki+10; this
significantly decreases the storage overhead for TESLA
keys. For an off-the-shelf vehicular OBU, 864, 000 hash
computations can be completed within a few seconds and
a storage overhead of 8.64 MB (864 KB if keys at every
10 slots are stored) per day is acceptable.
4.3. Beacon queue maintenance
The format of a signed beacon in our scheme is changed
into:
Beaconi = {Status, ti,Ki−1, H1, ...,Hα}σ
PC
(1)
and the format of a beacon message (i.e., a signed bea-
con attached with a TESLA MAC) is:
Mi = {Beaconi,MACK′i(Beaconi)} (2)
Status consists of vehicle status information, including
location, velocity, direction, etc. ti is the timestamp of
the beacon message, which should be within the time slot
Ti. Ki−1 is the TESLA key for the previous beacon (or
time slot). H1, ...,Hα are the hashes of latest (based on
the times of reception) verified beacons: the beacons that
the signatures were verified, not cooperatively verified or
verified based on TESLA keys and MACs.
Algorithm 1 shows the beacon reception process. Con-
sider a received beacon message, Mi. Attached PC of
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Algorithm 1 Beacon reception
1: Received a beacon message Mi
2: Mi = {Beaconi = {Status, ti,Ki−1, H1...Hα}σ
PC
,MACi}
3: if PC ∈ CACHED PC then
4: if No beacon with Ki−1 was received, and Ki−1 is the correct key corresponds to time slot of ti then
5: Insert {Mi, H(Mi)} to the head of Queue1.
6: Find beacon message, M ′, attached with PC from Queue1.
7: if M ′ is found then
8: Remove M ′ from Queue1.
9: Input M ′ to Algorithm 4 for TESLA MAC validation.
10: end if
11: else
12: Drop Mi.
13: end if
14: else
15: Insert {Mi, H(Mi)} to the head of Queue1.
16: end if
Algorithm 2 Queue element selection
1: if Queue2 is not empty then
2: Choose first element, E, from Queue2.
3: if Multiple elements exist in Queue2 with same PC of E then
4: Choose the element, E, with the latest timestamp.
5: end if
6: else if Queue1 is not empty then
7: k element(s) exist(s) in Queue1 with beacon timestamps satisfy tbeacon + 1/γ > tnext .
8: if k > 0 then
9: Uniform randomly selects an element, E, from k first elements of Queue1.
10: else if k = 0 then
11: Choose first element, E, from Queue1.
12: end if
13: end if
14: Input E to Algorithm 3.
Mi is checked first. If it was verified and cached (sim-
plified as cached in the rest of the paper), then the re-
ceiver checks whether the attached TESLA key is correct.
This is done by validating it against the TESLA key in a
previous beacon from the same sender1. For example, if a
beacon, Mi−2, received during the time slot, Ti−2, was ver-
ified based on signature and includes a TESLA key, Ki−3.
Then, the correct TESLA key disclosed in Ti should be
H2(Ki−3), i.e., H(H(Ki−3)). If multiple beacons with the
correct TESLA key, Ki−1, were received, only the first of
them is kept, due to the nature of single hop communica-
tion (see Sec. 5 for further analysis).
If Mi satisfies the above requirement or the attached
PC is non-cached, then the receiver generates a queue el-
ement and insert it to the head of Queue1:
{Mi, H(Mi)} (3)
1We refer a pseudonymous identity as a sender. Thus, messages
attached with the PC are considered sent from the same sender, while
beacons sent under two different PCs (from the same node) can be
considered sent from two different senders in this context.
Each node maintains two queues. Queue1 stores newly
received beacon messages and Queue2 stores potentially
valid beacon messages with non-cached PCs attached to
them. Elements in Queue2 are extracted from Queue1
during the execution of Algorithms 3 and 4 (explained be-
low). Queue2 is given higher priority in order to ensure
timely awareness of newly encountered nodes when com-
putation resource is scarce; the beacons signed under the
cached PCs can be validated through the “cheaper” MACs.
The selection of the beacons to verify from the queues
is done according to Algorithm 2. When Queue2 is not
empty, the node pops an element from the head. Consider
the sender of this element (i.e., beacon) is V . If multiple
elements sent from V exist inQueue2, the element with the
most recent timestamp is chosen: validating this beacon
can further validate earlier beacons based on MACs.
If Queue2 is empty, an element from Queue1 is se-
lected. Unlike element selection from Queue2, the ele-
ment here is randomly chosen among those that satisfy
the condition: tbeacon + 1/γ > tnext, where tbeacon is the
timestamp of each queued beacon and tnext is the time
point for the next own beacon broadcast. Recall that in
Algorithm 1, the new elements are inserted at the head
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Algorithm 3 Cooperative verification
1: E = {M,H(M)}
2: M = {Beacon = {Status, ti,Ki−1, H1...Hα}σ,MACi}
3: if The signature of Beacon is valid then
4: Accept Beacon.
5: if PC of Beacon is new then
6: Add PC to CACHED PC.
7: Extract beacon(s) signed under the same PC from Queue2 and Queue1 except the latest one;
8: store the extracted beacon(s) to BEACON SET and remove BEACON SET from Queue1.
9: for Each Mi in BEACON SET do
10: Input Mi to Algorithm 4 for TESLA MAC validation.
11: end for
12: end if
13: for Each Hi in H1..Hα of Beacon do
14: if An element, E′, with the message hash, Hi, is found in Queue1 then
15: E′ = {M ′ = {Beacon′,MAC′}, H(M ′)}
16: if PC′ of Beacon′ is in CACHED PC then
17: Accept Beacon′.
18: else
19: Remove E′ from Queue1 and insert to the end of Queue2.
20: end if
21: end if
22: end for
23: end if
V1
V3
V2
V4
1. A beacon chosen from Queue1/2
based on Algorithm 2
2. Ver
ify
signat
ure
3. Vlidate queued beacons
received from V3 with TESLA key, if any
5. PCV2 is cached; validate MV2,m
6. PCV4 is non-cached;   insert MV4,n to Queue2
Beaconi
MACK'i (Beaconi)
MV3,i =
4. Searc
h with h
ashes
in Queu
e1
Figure 3: An example of cooperative verification steps (Algorithm 3).
of Queue1 and, here, an element is chosen again from the
head of Queue1. The following three reasons led to such a
Last Come First Served (LCFS) and conditional random-
ized selection process:
• Verifications of fresh beacons benefit other nodes
when the results are shared through own beacons.
For example, in a traditional First-Come First-Served
(FCFS) scheme, consider a node (V1) that chooses a
beacon, MV2,i−1, from Queue1 for signature verifi-
cation, while the latest beacon from V2, MV2,i, was
lost. Then, sharing this result is not helpful for the
receiver, V3, which received both MV2,i−1 and MV2,i,
because MV2,i−1 was already validated based on the
TESLA key disclosed with MV2,i.
• Randomized selection among fresh beacons guaran-
tees that the nodes would not choose the same latest
received beacon to verify, thus decreases duplicated
signature verifications performed by the cooperating
nodes.
• The time condition (tbeacon + 1/γ > tnext) guaran-
tees that, before the dissemination of next own bea-
con, the beacons, corresponding to piggybacked ver-
ification results, have not been validated based on
TESLA MACs by receivers, otherwise, the shared
verification results could be less useful.
If no beacon message satisfies the time condition, then
the first queue element is popped from the head of Queue1.
4.4. Cooperative beacon verification
Algorithm 3 shows our cooperative verification scheme,
taking E chosen from Algorithm 2 as the input. The sig-
nature(s) of (the attached non-cached PC and) M is(are)
verified first. If PC is non-cached, then it is cached and the
beacons from the same sender can be validated based on
TESLA MACs (except the most recent one, for which the
corresponding TESLA key has not been disclosed/received).
The hashes H1, ...,Hα in M are used to validate further
the beacons in Queue1. The node searches, with each Hi,
in Queue1 for a matching H(M
′). If a matching queue
6
Algorithm 4 TESLA MAC Validation
1: Mi = {Beaconi = {Status, ti,Ki−1, H1...Hα}σ,MACi}
2: if MACK′i(Beaconi) = MACi then
3: Accept Beaconi.
4: for Each Hi in H1..Hα of Beacon do
5: if An element, E, with the message hash, Hi, is found in Queue1 then
6: if PC of Beacon is not in CACHED PC then
7: Remove E from Queue1 and insert to the tail of Queue2.
8: end if
9: end if
10: end for
11: else
12: Drop M .
13: end if
element is found, the node checks whether the attached
PC ′ is cached. If yes, then M ′ is accepted. Otherwise,
the element is inserted to the tail of Queue2. For the
latter case, M ′ is not simply accepted because this vali-
dation is correlated with the validations of extra beacon
messages carrying the same PC ′ based on TESLA MACs,
thus the security risk is high (see Sec. 5 for further anal-
ysis). Fig. 3 shows an example of the cooperative veri-
fication scheme: V1 chooses a beacon from its queue for
signature verification. After the signature verification is
passed, Ki−1 is used to validate queued beacons sent from
V3. A piggybacked hash value, Hj is found to match a bea-
con attached with PCV2 . As a result, MV2,m is accepted,
because PCV2 is already cached. Moreover, another hash
value, Hk, is found to match a beacon, MV4,n, while PCV4
is non-cached. Therefore, MV4,n is inserted to Queue2 for
a signature verification later.
4.5. TESLA-based validation
Each TESLA-based validation (in Algorithms 1 and 3)
is processed according to Algorithm 4. If the TESLA MAC
is validated, then eachHi in the validated beacon is used to
search matching beacon message from Queue1. If there is
any matching beacon attached with non-cached PC, then
it is inserted to the tail of Queue2. The hashes are only
used to search for potentially valid beacon messages at-
tached with non-cached PCs, but not used for validating
beacons, because TESLA-based authentication does not
provide non-repudiation. Therefore, the TESLA-validated
beacons should not be used to further validate more bea-
cons (see Sec. 5 for further analysis).
5. Privacy and security Analysis
In this section, we provide privacy and security analysis
for our scheme. We emphasize that we are not concerned
here with the validity of the message content, e.g., the cor-
rectness of a location or an alert about emergency brak-
ing; those are orthogonal and can be addressed by relevant
consistency checking [24, 25] and data-centric security [26]
schemes. Here, we are concerned with incorrectly signed
(with arbitrary content) messages, and the attempt to sat-
urating benign vehicles with (fake) signature verifications
while affecting validations of authentic safety beacons.
5.1. Privacy analysis
We note that privacy is not weakened by our scheme.
The shared verification results in a beacon do not link
transmissions of any other node, beyond what one can
infer from the geographical information included in the
beacons themselves. An independent TESLA key chain is
generated for each PC, thus messages authenticated under
different PCs cannot be linked. Beacons correlated (i.e.,
linkable) based on the TESLA keys from a same TESLA
key chain are also signed under the same PC, so that they
can be already trivially linked based on the PC (at most
for a period, τ) even without TESLA keys, as is the case
for a traditional scheme.
5.2. Security analysis
Beacons in our scheme are validated based on one of
three components: (1) signature, (2) MAC, and (3) shared
verification result. We first analyze security properties for
each validation approach. Then, we discuss non-repudiation
provision, notably how to compensate for the lack of non-
repudiation in TESLA. Finally, we conclude with the anal-
ysis of resilience to DoS attacks of our scheme.
Signature verification: The use of pseudonymous
authentication, as per the standards under development [23,
9], guarantees non-repudiation and message integrity and
authentication; as long as the receiving node performs the
cryptographic validation itself (message signature and at-
tached pseudonym validation). Inclusion of fresh times-
tamps in messages and timestamp checking prevent replay
of messages.
TESLA-based validation: TESLA provides mes-
sage integrity and authentication after hash chain anchors
are verified with signatures [6]. Time synchronization (e.g.,
through GPS) guarantees that only the corresponding TESLA
keys are used at any point in time (see Fig. 2). Our
scheme prevents memory exhaustion attacks, because at
most one beacon carrying the correct TESLA key needs
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to be queued. This is due to the nature of single-hop com-
munication. The first beacon with the correct TESLA key
would be either (1) the (potentially) authentic one, or, (2)
if the authentic one was lost, the first among the mas-
queraded beacons attached with the correct TESLA key
(overheard by adversary after it was disclosed by its le-
gitimate sender). However, the latter one will be proven
invalid either through its signature verification or TESLA
MAC validation. This is not more harmful than receiving a
randomly created fake beacon, which is even easier to gen-
erate from the perspective of an adversary. We mandate
that each beacon is signed by the sender. If the content
of a beacon is suspicious, the receiver can choose to verify
the signature on the beacon, thus non-repudiation can be
achieved.
Cooperative verification: Shared verification results
in beacon messages are used to either find potentially valid
beacon messages attached with non-cached PCs or val-
idate latest beacons attached with cached PCs. For a
cached PC, there is always at most one beacon message
in Queue1 from the same sender. A shared verification
result matching this beacon could be used to validate this
beacon. In this case, non-repudiation, authentication and
integrity are not directly achieved based on signature or
TESLA MAC on the validated beacon, but the trust on
this beacon is established leveraging another node. If the
validated beacon is proven fake later, the node that shared
this verification result is accountable for this misbehavior.
A newer beacon from the same sender (as the validated
beacon) can help further corroborate the correctness of
cooperatively validated beacon (based on TESLA MAC).
Moreover, with mobility prediction [4] and content vali-
dation [24, 25] approaches, a vehicle can choose to accept
the cooperatively validated beacon only when the beacon
content is within the prediction/validation error threshold.
Again, when the content of any beacon is suspicious, signa-
ture can be verified to achieve immediate non-repudiation,
authentication and integrity.
On the other hand, for a non-cached PC, there could
exist several beacon messages from the same sender in
Queue1. A falsely accepted fake PC could result in ac-
cepting a series of false beacons. Therefore, the signature
of a beacon message attached with non-cached PC should
be verified (by inserting the beacon message to Queue2)
before the correlated beacons can be validated based on
TESLA MACs.
Non-repudiation: We mandate each beacon be signed
by the sender, so that signature verification can ensure
non-repudiation. However, TESLA-based validation and
cooperative verification cannot guarantee that the vali-
dated/accepted beacons are properly signed. Although
accountability for cooperatively verified beacons can be
traced to senders of verification results; TESLA-based val-
idation does not provide non-repudiation, as validations
are merely based on symmetric TESLA keys.
Consider an adversary fabricates beacons with disclosed
TESLA keys and claim the beacons were received at cor-
rect time slots (with correct TESLA keys and fake sig-
natures). The original generator of those TESLA keys
cannot deny the fabricated beacons were not sent by him-
/her-self. On the other hand, with this in mind, a legit-
imate sender can also send beacons with correct TESLA
keys and fake signatures at correct time slots. A receiver
would accept the beacons with TESLA-based validations,
and realize the signatures were invalid later. However, as
TESLA-based validations do not provide non-repudiation,
the sender cannot be held accountable, exactly because
the beacons presented by the victim might have been fab-
ricated (by the victim the same way the adversary did).
With such a vulnerability, TESLA-based validations
should be carefully used. This is the case in our scheme:
TESLA-based validations are only used for validating suc-
cessive beacons attached with cached PCs. Redundancy of
frequent beacons and predictability of vehicle status within
a short period [27] can minimize the vulnerability incurred
by the lack of non-repudiation: a beacon that deviates too
much from a previous signature-validated beacon can be
considered suspicious and the signature of this beacon can
be verified as a backup approach. Moreover, the piggy-
backed hash values in TESLA-validated beacons are only
used for discovering potentially valid beacons from new
senders, which are verified based on signatures later.
Thwarting clogging (D)DoS: With TESLA-based
validation, once a TESLA key for a PC is stored after
a successful signature verification, then the rest of the
beacons form the same sender can be validated based on
TESLA MACs. However, TESLA-based validation could
be helpful only after a successful signature verification
for a beacon message attached with a non-cached PC.
Discovery of authentic beacons attached with non-cached
PCs still remains an issue. This is problematic especially
when vehicles reach a time point for pseudonym change.
Flooded fictitious beacons can affect the verifications of
new PCs, thus the awareness of surrounding vehicles.
With our cooperative verification scheme, vehicles can
efficiently fetch potentially valid beacons attached with
non-cached PCs based on shared verification results and
verify them first in order to gain awareness of newly en-
countered vehicles with short delays. Once a beacon from a
sender vehicle has been successfully verified, the successive
beacon messages from the same sender can be validated
based on TESLA MACs or shared verification results.
6. Performance evaluation
In this section, we evaluate our scheme with simula-
tions. We show that our scheme achieves low delays in
high vehicle density scenario, and even under DDoS at-
tacks, which would not have been possible for the stan-
dard approach (signature verification of all received bea-
con messages, referred as baseline scheme in the rest of the
paper).
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Table 2: System Parameters (Bold for Default Setting)
N 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 , 70, 80
γ 10 Hz
Tvrfc 4 ms
Prloss 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8
α 1, 2, 3, 4 , 5
Nadv 4 (Static), 10 (Mobile)
γadv 250 Hz (No packet loss)
6.1. Simulation settings
We use OMNeT++ [28] to simulate our scheme and
analyze the system performance. We consider two mobil-
ity scenarios: a static scenario and a mobile scenario. For
the mobile scenario, Veins [29] is used for the connection
between SUMO [30] and OMNeT++. Table 2 shows the
system parameters and values used in the simulation. We
assume a communication range of 200 m with a packet
loss ratio of Prloss, i.e., a node can successfully receive a
broadcasted beacon within the communication range with
a probability, 1 − Prloss. We assume a signature verifi-
cation delay of Tvrfc for both PC verification and mes-
sage verification. For simplicity, we assume the beacon
validations based on hash computations (i.e., cooperative
validations or TESLA-based validations) incur zero delay
(in reality, they introduce a tiny delay, which can be in
the order of µs). For each simulation setting, we perform
5 randomly seeded experiments of 1 min and the results
are averaged over these 5 runs. The bold values in Ta-
ble 2 are the default ones used in our simulation. For
example, when N is the parameter we examine (Fig. 5b),
then the rest of the parameters have the default values:
Prloss = 0.2, Tvrfc = 4 ms, α = 4 and γ = 10 Hz.
Nadv = 4 and γadv = 250 Hz are only set for adversarial
network scenarios. The default values of Tvrfc and γ are
typical values based on the literature (e.g., [2, 23]). Note
that we assume all beacons from adversaries are received
by benign nodes (within the communication range without
any packet loss) in order to simulate an extreme situation.
For example, when Prloss = 0.8, the equivalent real bea-
con rate from each adversarial node would be 1250 Hz.
This could be non-realistic for a single adversary, but we
can consider one adversarial node in our evaluation as an
aggregate of multiple adversarial nodes in reality.
6.2. Static mobility scenario
Fig. 4 shows the simulated area for the static scenario:
we place the node we evaluate in the center of a 200 m
disc area, and place N nodes randomly within the disc.
Moreover, another 3 ∗ N nodes (thus, a same node den-
sity as in the inner disc) are placed at the outer disc (i.e.,
gray area). We consider this setup to avoid evaluating the
scheme in a setting that is overly optimistic and favorable
for our scheme. As we assume an effective communication
range of 200 m, the node we evaluate receives beacons from
200 m N 3*N200 m 199 m
Figure 4: Static scenario: Simulated area with the evaluated node at
the center with a neighbor density of N . X marks indicate placement
of adversarial nodes.
senders within the inner disc. However, the node in the
inner disc will also receive messages from the outer disc
(gray area). We add this 200 m extra area to emulate a
more realistic scenario, in which the evaluated node could
also receive verification results that it is not interested in.
Otherwise, if simulated only with the inner disc, the sce-
nario would be very optimistic: all the verification results
piggybacked by the received beacons will be useful (i.e.,
corresponds to beacons within the communication range).
Benign network: We start from the evaluation un-
der benign network conditions, without adversarial nodes
launching a DDoS attack. All nodes start beaconing at
same time (at the beginning of each simulation run). This
essentially simulates the situation that vehicles reach a
time point for PC change, which can be considered as the
most challenging situation in a benign network.
Fig. 5 shows average waiting time and Fig. 6 shows ra-
tio of validated beacons based on different validation types.
Waiting time of a beacon is defined as the waited time in
queue (from the reception time point) before its valida-
tion/verification. Fig. 5a shows the average waiting time
for the baseline scheme as a function of N . For N = 20
and N = 30, we use baseline scheme without TESLA or
cooperative verification (i.e., α = 0). When N ≥ 40, the
queue would not be sustainable: the average message ar-
rival rate would be N ∗ γ ∗ (1 − Prloss) ≥ 320 Hz, while
only at most 250 (i.e., 1 sTvrfc ) signature verifications can be
performed per second. Therefore, we use TESLA [12, 13]
without cooperative verification for N ≥ 40. We see when
N ≥ 40, the average waiting time is around 0.1 s, much
higher than that for N ≤ 30. This is due to a signifi-
cant ratio of beacon messages need to be validated based
on TESLA MACs, as shown in Fig. 6a. Fig. 5b shows
the average waiting time with our cooperative verification
scheme under default settings (see Table 2). The average
waiting time is significantly decreased thanks to shared
verification results. For example, for the default settings
(N = 60), the average waiting time is decreased from
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Figure 5: Benign and Static: Average waiting time as a function of N with (a) baseline scheme (α = 0 and TESLA for N ≥ 40) and (b)
cooperative beacon verification, and as a function of (c) α and (d) Prloss under default settings.
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Figure 6: Benign and Static: Ratio of validated beacons based on different validation types as a function of N with (a) baseline scheme (α = 0
and TESLA for N ≥ 40) and (b) cooperative beacon verification, and as a function of (c) α and (d) Prloss under default settings.
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Figure 7: Benign and Static: Passed system time as a function of total verified pseudonyms (out of N) with different (a) N , (b) α and (c)
Prloss.
around 0.1 s (baseline scheme with TESLA) to 0.045 s
(our scheme). From Fig. 6b, we see that, when N is high,
a significant ratio of beacons are validated cooperatively
or based on TESLA MACs while a smaller ratio of beacons
is validated based on signatures.
Fig. 5c shows the average waiting time as a function
of α. The average waiting time decreases with larger α
because more beacons can be validated based on shared
verification results, as shown in Fig. 6c. However, the
improvement becomes moderate when α is higher (e.g.,
from α = 4 to α = 5). Therefore, a reasonable α can be
chosen based on different network scenarios to introduce
minimum communication overhead (for the attached veri-
fication results). The average waiting time also decreases
with higher Prloss (Fig. 5d) because less beacons can be
received. As a result, a higher ratio of beacons can be
validated based on signature verifications (Fig. 6d).
Fig. 7 shows the progression of non-cached PC verifi-
cation under different settings. For example, with N = 20
in Fig. 7a, all PCs can be verified after around 0.25 s from
the beginning of simulation. As described earlier, once a
beacon message with non-cached PC is verified, then the
rest of beacon messages attached with the same PC can be
validated based on TESLA MACs or shared verification re-
sults. From Fig. 7, we see all the PCs are verified within 1 s
under different settings, which indicates the node can gain
awareness of all their neighbors within 1 s. Once a beacon
message from a newly encountered vehicle is verified, the
vehicle can continuously keep track of the corresponding
vehicle with cheap TESLA-based validations and cooper-
ative beacon verifications. This is beneficial especially for
a high neighbor density scenario or under a DDoS attack
(see below).
Adversarial network: We further consider the ad-
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Figure 8: Adversarial and Static: Average waiting time as a function of Prloss with (a) α = 2 and (d) α = 4. Ratio of beacon validation
types as a function of Prloss with (b) α = 2 and (e) α = 4.
versarial network scenarios, where benign nodes are under
DDoS attacks. The four adversarial nodes start flooding
with fictitious beacons (attached with false signatures and
PCs) from the beginning of the simulation and the benign
nodes start beaconing after 10 c. The simulation finishes
after 1 min (thus, 70 s in total). Here, we also consider rel-
atively high Prloss (e.g., 0.6 and 0.8), because it is normal
to have more packet losses when the network is saturated
by the fictitious beacons at a high rate.
Figs. 8a and 8d show the average waiting time as a
function of Prloss when α = 2 and α = 4 respectively. We
see with higher Prloss, the average waiting time increases,
because the majority of beacons have to be validated based
on TESLA MACs, as shown in Figs. 8b and 8e. A signifi-
cant portion of CPU cycles are occupied for verifying fic-
titious beacons (in an attempt to find new authentic/valid
PCs). For example, when Prloss = 0.8, the average wait-
ing time is more than 0.4 s. However, this is still a signif-
icant improvement from the baseline scheme, with which
the queue would not be even sustainable and waiting time
would continuously increase as the time progresses. For
example, from simulation results (not shown in the fig-
ures), we find that when α = 0, only a few pseudonyms
can be verified within 70 s, because the queue is filled with
fictitious beacons. This cannot be solved even by setting
a lifetime, e.g., 1 s, for each received beacon (a beacon is
dropped if it stayed in the queue for more than 1 s), be-
cause the majority of authentic beacons are also dropped
due to expiration. We see with higher α, the average wait-
ing time slightly decreases (from Fig. 8a to Fig. 8d) thanks
to more beacons can be validated based on shared verifi-
cation results (Figs. 8b and 8e).
From Figs. 8c and 8f, we see that all PCs can be verified
within 3 s when Prloss ≤ 0.6. When Prloss = 0.8, more
time is needed to gain awareness of all neighboring nodes:
more than 10 s when α = 2 and around 5 s when α = 4.
However, as mentioned earlier, this is still a significant
improvement considering only a few PCs can be verified
within 60 s after beaconing begins without cooperative
verification.
6.3. Highway scenario
Fig. 9 shows the simulated area for the highway sce-
nario. We consider a six-lane 1.5 km highway section, with
vehicles entering from both ends. We set the vehicle ar-
rival rate to make the average neighbor density roughly 60
(N = 58.57 on average exactly, measured from the simula-
tion results). For this scenario, the first 1 min of each sim-
ulation run is used as a warm-up phase to make nodes spa-
tially distributed across the simulated area. Nodes start
beaconing from 60 s and the results between 60 s – 120 s is
used. Waiting times are collected from nodes when passing
the gray area (Fig. 9).
Benign network: In the highway scenario, nodes
could continuously encounter new nodes during their trips.
It is important that a node gains awareness of any new
node entering its communication range on a timely man-
ner. We first evaluate the average pseudonym validation
delay, which reflects the speed of discovering new PCs
(thus their owners). Pseudonym validation delay is defined
as the passed time from a new node (PC) is encountered
(in terms of received beacons) until at least one beacon
from that node is verified. As described in Sec. 4, after a
beacon is verified with signature, then the successive bea-
cons from that node can be validated at least based on
(relatively cheaper) TESLA MACs.
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Figure 9: Highway scenario: A six-lane highway scenario with a neighbor density N ≈ 60; results collected from nodes passing the gray area
(central 300 m area). X marks indicate placement of adversarial nodes.
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Figure 10: Benign and Highway: CDF of pseudonym validation delay as a function of (a) α and (d) Prloss. Average waiting time as a
function of (b) α and (e) Prloss. Ratio of validated beacons based on different validation types as a function of (c) α and (f) Prloss.
We record pseudonym validation delays for each pair
of sender/receiver satisfying the condition: the distance
between two nodes had been less than 150 m. This essen-
tially eliminates node pairs that only had been at the bor-
der of communication range of each other. From Figs. 10a
and 10d, we see pseudonym validation delays are almost al-
ways less than 1 s with our scheme. This indicates that any
pair of nodes that were closer than 150 m can discover each
other within 1 s. However, with only TESLA-based val-
idation (α = 0), pseudonym validation delay significantly
increases: only around 80 % of nodes can be discovered
within 1 s.
Figs. 10b and 10e show average waiting time as a func-
tion of α and Prloss respectively, and Figs. 10c and 10f
show ratios of beacon validation types as a function of α
and Prloss respectively. We see the average waiting times
and ratios of validation types are roughly same as those in
the static scenario with N = 60 (see Fig. 5).
Adversarial network: We continue with evaluation
under the adversarial network scenarios. Here, we first
evaluate pseudonym validation ratio. Pseudonym valida-
tion ratio is defined as the ratio of validated PCs (i.e.,
discovered nodes) over total received legitimate PCs (i.e.,
encountered nodes) at the end of nodes’ trips, reflecting
the degree of awareness of neighboring nodes. Fig. 11
shows pseudonym validation ratio with α = 0, 2, 4 re-
spectively. Without the cooperative verification scheme
(Fig. 11a when α = 0), only slightly more than 50 % of
PCs can be validated, because the majority of computa-
tion resource was dedicated for verifying fake signatures.
Moreover, even those 50 % of PCs are validated with high
delays (see Fig. 12a): only around 80 % (among the above-
mentioned 50 %) of PCs can be validated within 5 s.
Figs. 11b and 11c show that, with our scheme, the
nodes can effectively discover (in fact, almost all) valid
PCs even under the DDoS attack. We see the pseudonym
validation ratios are almost 100 %, but slightly less than
100 % with high Prloss values. This is because pseudonym
validation delays are higher with higher Prloss values (see
Figs. 12b and 12c): newly received PCs have not been
validated at the end of node trips, while we can expect
that these PCs could have been validated if the node trips
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Figure 11: Adversarial and Highway: Pseudonym validation ratio as a function of Prloss with (a) α = 0, (b) α = 2 and (c) α = 4.
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Figure 12: Adversarial and Highway: CDF of pseudonym validation delay as a function of Prloss with (a) α = 0, (b) α = 2 and (c) α = 4.
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Figure 13: Adversarial and Highway: Average waiting time as a function of Prloss with (a) α = 2 and (b) α = 4. Ratio of validated beacons
based on different validation types as a function of Prloss with (c) α = 2 and (d) α = 4.
continued further.
Fig. 13 shows average waiting times and ratios of val-
idation types for the highway scenario under the DDoS
attack. We see our scheme still provides reasonable wait-
ing times (Figs. 13a and 13b) while more beacons have
to be validated based on TESLA MACs and piggybacked
verification results (Figs. 13c and 13d).
7. Discussions and conclusions
In this paper, we consider a beacon rate of 10 Hz.
However, adaptive beacon rate schemes [31, 27, 32] adapt
beaconing rates (generally lower than 10 Hz) based on the
context (e.g., speed, vehicle density) for increased reliabil-
ity and lower computation and communication overhead.
Our scheme can be readily combined with adaptive bea-
con rate schemes. TESLA key chain generation and usage
can be kept unchanged, but when beacon interval is larger
than 0.1 s, the TESLA keys in between can be simply
skipped. Skipped time slots are equivalent to lost bea-
cons, thus transparent to the receiver (i.e., no change is
needed for the beacon reception and validation processes),
but the sender is taking the initiative.
We mandate each beacon to be signed by its sender so
that the receiver can always choose to verify the signature
if necessary, notably to achieve non-repudiation. Future
work will address this explicitly, i.e., the conditions a re-
ceiver needs to verify signatures in order to minimize se-
curity risks incurred by internal adversaries (e.g., sharing
false verification results or attaching fake signatures with
correct TESLA keys and MACs).
We demonstrated how our cooperative beacon verifica-
tion scheme could enable secure VC at network densities
even double compared to those prior approaches could be
workable for. Even under DoS attacks, vehicles could still
maintain a low waiting time for each received beacon so
13
that the vehicles can gain awareness of neighboring vehi-
cles within short time period. In addition, our scheme is
orthogonal to all prior optimizations and could comple-
ment them.
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